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BOOK REVIEW

Judicial Control of Administrative Action
By Louis L. JAFFE
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965. Pp. xvi, 792. $20.00
and

The Ombudsman, Citizen's Defender
EDITED BY DONALD

C.

ROWAT

London: George Allen & Univin, Ltd., 1965. Pp. 348. $8.25
Can the judiciary be counted on to be the official ombudsman of
the citizen? Will the judiciary be the citizen's defender? Neither
of these questions are answered by the authors of the reviewed
books; but both books are illustrative of actual and prospective control over administrative action.
To say Professor Jaffe's book is the most comprehensive and
analytical approach to the problem of judicial control of administrative action is an understatement. It is the book on the subject.
A series of law review articles, published in the Harvard, Buffalo, Michigan and Pennsylvania Law Reviews, heralded the advent
of the work of judicial control of administrative actions. This reviewer expected that these articles would be warmed over, expanded

and published as a new statement on the subject -but,
such was
not the case. Indeed, in addition to these articles, there are new
chapters entitled "Constitutional Competence of Court and Agency,"
"Judicial Stays Pending Administrative Action," "Temporary Judicial Stays of Administrative Action" and "Exclusive Jurisdiction
and Remand." In addition, the chapter entitled "The System of
Judicial Remedies" has been completely revised and expanded.
Perhaps the first two chapters of this work, "Introduction: the
Administrative Process" and "Delegation Legislative Power," are the
most important. Therein, the foundation for understanding administrative actions as well as the judicial checks on those actions are delineated.
The first chapter is a revision of an article which appeared in
the Harvard Law Review.' This chapter describes the role of the administrative process in view of what is currently transpiring in the
I Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process.' A Re-evaluation, 67 HARV.
L. REV. 1105 (1954).
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world of the administrative agency. Included is a historical development of the administrative process and some observations on the
current controversy involving that process. Concluding this chapter,
Jaffe states what most interested parties would perhaps like to know
most, ... are these agencies as we know them 'expert'?" 2 This question of expertise is the one that most often is asked when the litigating parties go before an administrative tribunal.
In the second chapter, which is also a revision of previous articles on the delegation of legislative power, the author ponders the
question of whether or not a book whose central theme is the relationship between court and agency should have a chapter on delegation of powers. His answer is simple:
It is the central theme of this book that agencies and courts are in
a partnership of lawmaking and law applying. The legislative delegation of power is the matrix, the charter as it were of this activity.
seem appropriate to probe the character of the
If that is so it would
3
delegation device.
And probe he does. Neatly dissected and lain bare for all to see is
the general theory of delegation as well as the development of the
doctrine of the separation of powers. Succinctly he points out that
while the delegation of power is the dynamo, the power supply to
the administrative agency, the judiciary is the accepted constitutional
circuit-breaker of that power. The constitutional system of checks
and balances is thereby preserved. Furthermore, in spite of criticism
for forcing the legislature to do its job well, the judiciary must continue to set standards in order that the dynamo of administrative
process does not go unchecked.
What has long been thought to be a problem in the area of administrative decisions, the force of res judicata upon the agencies
and the courts, is skirted by the book. In chapters 14 and 15, however, the consideration of judicial review of questions of law and
questions of fact carries the clear import of such a discussion. Although the words res judicata are not used, the reader cannot escape
the conclusion upon finishing the book that the subject has been
covered.
While ingesting the Jaffe book the reviewer questioned whether
a better way to control administrative action could be provided. If
the control of administrative action is left in the hands of the judiciary, the ultimate user of the administrative process is still at the
mercy of a super authority. Since the system of checks and balances
works, if at all, only for those who are checking or balancing, who
2 JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 25 (1965).

3 Id. at vii.
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checks for the ultimate user of the administrative process, the common man? In many countries it is the obudsman; and it is through
the obudsman that a better method of administrative control may
exist.
Who is the ombudsman? What are his duties? How did the
ombudsman's office come into being? What are his powers? To
whom is he responsible? Ronald C. Rowat's book, The Ombudsman:
Citizen's Defender, answers these questions and asks a few more.
In twenty-nine articles by writers from thirteen different countries
bits and pieces of information explain existent systems employing
the office of ombudsman.
One might say that the ombudsman is the manager of a country's
complaint department. He is an appointed official whose duty it is
to investigate complaints of a private citizen with respect to any
legislative, and presumably administrative, abuse. His powers are
such that he may subpoena witnesses, compel testimony, review
facts, form opinions based on these facts, and publish findings of
fact and opinion. He cannot, however, change a decision nor may
he punish, except by way of publishing his opinion, any person.
The function of the ombudsman is to make the government
aware that abuses have arisen which ought to be corrected. The administrative agency which has felt the sting of the ombudsman's
published opinion often sees the wisdom of the opinion and changes
its ways accordingly. The administrative agency, though not bound
by the decisions of the ombudsman, having seen the reasonableness
of the decision, often adopts an action which is more beneficial and
more predictable to the common man.
Though not a part of the law of any nation until first suggested
by the Swedish Constitution of 1809, the office of ombudsman had
as its counterpart the Swedish Supreme Procurator (H6gste Ombudsman).' This office created by King Charles XII through his Order
of Chancery in 1713, had as it most important function the twofold
task of supervising the enforcement and compliance by the citizenry
with laws and regulations and the ensurance that all public officials
discharged their duties in a proper manner.
Since that early beginning the office of ombudsman has been
introduced in many nations around the world. In the United States,
California, Connecticut, Illinois and New York (even New York
City has endeavered to establish the office of ombudsman) have
begun the initial establishment of a state ombudsman.
Chapter 3, "Proposed Schemes," insists that it be read. Within
4 ROWAT, THE OMBUDSMAN,

CITIZEN'S DEFENDER

17

(1965).
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this chapter, Representative Henry S. Reuss (D., Wis.) and his
legislative assistant, Everard Munsey, set out their proposed scheme
for an ombudsman in the United States. With some preliminary
discussion of the unsuccessful Philippine Presidential Complaints
and Action Committee, which was abolished because "itwas alleged
that its methods of investigation encroached upon the civil liberties
of the citizen,'

'

Mr. Reuss proposes that an Administrative Counsel

be established in order that the legislator might help his constituents
while still performing his legislative duties. In the House of Representatives the ombudsman sitting on the Administrative Counsel
would perform functions similar to those of his foreign colleagues.
The major criticism of Mr. Reuss' plan is that the ombudsman
would still be a person in the employ of Congress. Thus, in the case
of an uncooperative ombudsman, appropriations could result in his
being put on a starvation diet.
In conclusion, the question is apparently judicial review or ombudsman checking. Judicial supervision of administrative process
does work; but, only in an agonizingly slow manner. The ombudsman is more approachable, and provides less expensive, more direct
and quicker review. Thus, would it not be possible to augment the
judiciary with an independent ombudsman whose very presence
might force the administrative agencies into more predictable actions
- actions reflective of a true measure of justice?
Alphonse Michael Squillante*
5

Id. at 159.
*Assistant Professor of Law and Law Librarian, University of Denver College of Law.
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